The experience of several host countries shows that small initial in#ows of migrants have a perpetuating e!ect on further migration from the same country of origin. This paper studies the interplay of factors that determine the transitional dynamics of migration #ows in the presence of social relationships between migrants. We fully specify and formally solve a stochastic two-country model of chain migration with one sending and one receiving country in which initial immigration patterns matter for future immigration patterns. Numerical calculations illustrate the crucial role of the wage elasticity of labor demand in counteracting the potential explosiveness of chain migration.
Introduction
The experience of several host countries has shown that small initial #ows of migrants from a particular source country have a perpetuating e!ect on further migration from that country. While the consequences of social relationships in prompting self-perpetuating migration #ows have been subject to extensive study, not much is known yet about the interplay of the underlying factors in determining the dynamics of such migration #ows. It is the primary objective of the present paper to study the transitional migration dynamics during periods when the stock of migrants is small compared to the stock of natives. We elaborate conditions under which immigration has a self-enhancing e!ect on further immigration, and conversely, we specify factors which may counteract the possible explosiveness of chain migration.
The economically oriented, theoretical literature on labor migration is largely based on the assumption that migrants form a homogeneous entity (Grubel and Scott, 1966; Kemp, 1969; Rivera-Batiz, 1982) . But a given migrant is di!erent from the previous migrant by the very nature of his or her order. In particular, the central role of linkages across family members in shaping the migration pattern has been studied by Mincer (1978) and Borjas and Bronars (1991) . At the national level, &gravity-type' models of migration rest on the hypotheses that migration is positively related to the size of the relevant origin and destination populations and inversely related to distance (Greenwood, 1975) . In addition to the before-mentioned concepts, in this paper we draw upon the concept of chain migration (MacDonald and MacDonald, 1964; Gurak and Caces, 1992) to di!erentiate between migrants conditional on the existence of pre-migration links towards the country of destination. A review of recent theoretical work on chain migration is included in Massey et al. (1993) while the empirical strand of research on chain migration is pursued, among others, by Rosenzweig (1986, 1989) as well as Boyd (1989) .
Chain migrants exhibit features that essentially di!er from those of single migrants. Contrary to single migrants, chain migrants enjoy the advantage of receiving information about labor market opportunities from their network abroad as well as assistance in "nding a job. A chain migrant can also reduce accommodation expenses by sharing housing with members of the network. The income equivalent of such bene"ts diminishes the expenses necessary to maintain a baseline consumption level, that is the required expenses to reach a certain utility level are likely to be lower for chain migrants than for single migrants. It follows that faced with a choice of destination countries, an individual who has a network in one country but none in another may choose the former even if wage rates in the latter are higher.
The next section introduces a benchmark model of chain migration with a deterministic labor market framework. In Section 3 we proceed with a model of chain migration under stochastic labor market conditions. The results of numerical calculations are discussed in Section 4. Concluding remarks complete the paper.
This assumption reduces the technical load but could be relaxed without changing the core of the model. This period may vary from three to twelve months depending on the country of destination. Several authors pointed out that the elasticity of labor demand is higher for low-skill labor than for high-skill labor (Elmeskov, 1993; Snessens, 1993; Hamermesh, 1986; Johnson and Layard, 1986) . In the context of this paper, however, heterogeneity with respect to migrants' skills is irrelevant since they are unobservable upon entry. Hence, employers view migrants as a pooled group with average skills (Stark, 1995) and o!er the same wage independent of their true skill level. Later employers may decipher migrants' true skill level and adjust wages accordingly, but this does not impinge on the immigration dynamics that has been determined earlier.
A deterministic benchmark model
Consider the case of two countries, one sending and one receiving. Wages are assumed to be higher in the foreign country (F) than in the home country (H), and thus there is an incentive to migrate from H to F. We abstract from growth in F arising from technological progress, capital accumulation, or population growth but assume that population growth in H just compensates the out#ow. Home country inhabitants are in the state of potential migration from the moment of their decision to migrate up to the end of the job searching process in the immigration country. From these, only those who "nd a job stay and constitute the net in#ow of migrants. This assumption is in line with the practice of immigration authorities not to count individuals from foreign countries who spend less than three months in the destination country, as migrants.
The #ows of potential migrants result from the interplay of both push and pull factors (Lee, 1966) . Every period a constant fraction of H inhabitants, , migrates from H to F because of exogenously given push factors, such as poor living conditions or ethnical and/or political con#icts. This implies a "xed number of potential single migrants per period. Each migrant who resides in F represents a center of attraction for further migration, exhibiting a constant pull capacity per person, . All migrants who are attracted by such a process are called chain migrants. Since the periodic out#ow of migrants is supposed to be small relative to the population size of H, we do not consider the interaction between the two migration-prompting mechanisms, that is the same person's decision to migrate is induced either by the push factor or by the pull factor but not by both factors together.
Single migrants, C , di!er from chain migrants, C , in that the baseline consumption expenses are higher for single migrants than for chain migrants, C 'C . If the wage o!ered at destination is su$cient to cover the baseline consumption expenses and is higher than the wage at origin, the migrant accepts the o!er. Having no assets, otherwise he or she returns (or, for that matter, migrates elsewhere) since the time span available upon entry for searching a job that generates a su$cient income is limited for legislative reasons and borrowing against future earnings is not possible.
Assuming that the slope of the labor demand curve at destination is negative, the equilibrium wage declines with the size of the in#ow. Without migration, This wage}employment mechanism is valid only if native and immigrant labor are assumed to be substitutes.
There are no problems with deriving a similar equation for a constant elasticity labor demand curve.
the equilibrium wage level in the host country is determined by the function w (t). Immigration pushes the equilibrium wage downwards so that the new equilibrium wage w (t), from a linear approximation of a Taylor expansion, is given by
where n(t) denotes the in#ow of migrants in period t, and¸ is equal to the amount of labor employed in equilibrium at the wage w (t). If we ignore growth arising from technological progress or capital accumulation, the production function and the labor demand function are constant through time. The parameter denotes the slope of the labor demand curve in the destination country,
where w * "dw/d¸. For the vector (w "1,¸"1), which can be obtained from any initial values by normalization, we also have "!d¸/dw(w/¸). The inverse expression, 1/ , can be interpreted as the wage elasticity of labor demand in the pre-migration labor market equilibrium of two countries of equal population size. In this framework there exists a single equilibrium wage in the economy which clears the labor market.
Formally, for migration starting from the zero level we have the di!erential equation
where the H population, N & , has been normalized to 1. Eq. (3) states that the periodic in#ow of migrants consists of a constant component which represents immigration due to the push mechanism, and of a component that evolves proportionally to the stock of migrants already residing in F, N $ . Due to immigration, F wages decline and potential single migrants will no longer "nd it advantageous to migrate, and hence migration to F is governed by
As migration and the decline of wages continues, wages will eventually fall to the subsistence level of chain migrants and thus immigration will terminate,
If the stock of the domestic population in F is normalized to 1 and F and H are of the same size, the range of admissible values for Eq. (3) is given by
The benchmark model (3)}(5) has the explicit solution
Eqs. (6)}(8) specify the dynamics of migration through time. In pushing wages below the subsistence levels of chain and single migrants, ongoing migration brings about the endogenous transition between the three labor market regimes, and migration eventually ceases.
Chain migration in a stochastic labor market framework
As it stands, from an empirical point of view the deterministic model has an important shortcoming. With the deterministic labor market speci"cation assumed in the benchmark model there is absolutely no possibility for new migrants to "nd a job once all vacancies have been occupied by earlier migrants. Based on the intuition that newly arriving migrants face a certain probability distribution of wages across vacancies when on job search, however, the probability to "nd a job which generates an income above the subsistence level, though being negatively related to the number of migrants already present in F, should not be zero.
In order to implement this notion, subsequently we model the dynamics of chain migration for a stochastic labor market framework with exponentially distributed wages across vacancies. Our decision to apply this particular distribution rests on two considerations. First, it nicely captures the concept that wages are inversely related to the number of available vacancies. Second, if the probability of a new vacancy with given wage to appear is proportional to the number of currently existing vacancies and the reservation wages of job seekers Furthermore, exponentially distributed wages over vacancies exhibit desirable technical properties. Since the wage function is continuously di!erentiable, it renders the derivation of exact solutions possible. In addition, exponentially distributed wages represent a density function for all wages in the relevant interval from 0 to in"nity and yet their cumulated probability amounts to 1.
The function w (t) for any given t is a scalar. Distributions are considered for given t only. Note that w (t) evolves over time proportionally to the average wage in the economy.
are exponentially distributed, then the steady state for the matching process is exactly described by an exponential distribution. We assume that during the search period every migrant receives only one o!er with a wage above w (t). The wage w (t) represents a constant percentage of the average wage of all vacancies and equals the wage of the lowest-paid vacancy that implies zero search costs. In order to fully specify the model, we extend the assumptions of the benchmark model as appropriate:
(a) Each migrant receives only one job o!er which he or she accepts if the associated draw from the wage distribution exceeds the subsistence level. The unsuccessful migrants return. According to the central limit theorem, for a continuum of migrants the random matching process between vacancies and migrants returns a certain percentage of migrants who "nd employment.
(b) We assume a continuum of labor markets with similar labor demand characteristics such that all distributions of wages and vacancies at any time represent the same family of functions and di!er from each other only by the variable scale parameter w (t). The multiplicity of labor markets is due to the heterogeneity of employers which stems from the application of di!erent production technologies.
For a continuum of reservation wages across migrants at a given skill level, high-wage vacancies are occupied with a higher probability than low-wage vacancies. Each migrant's opportunity to "nd a job with a wage w higher than w is represented by the exponential probability distribution
with determining the steepness of the distribution. As we abstract from transportation costs, only those migrants who obtain jobs with wages w'C G (i"h, s) stay while the others return. Subsequently, the cumulative probabilities that a single and a chain migrant "nd employment with a wage higher than the subsistence level are de"ned by p and p , respectively. Three cases of the level of the survival minimum abroad relative to the wage distribution across vacancies can be distinguished. In case (a) the minimum payment for vacancies exceeds the survival minimum for both single migrants and chain migrants. Thus, both categories of migrants are able to earn wages that are su$cient for survival with probability 1. In case (b) the lower border w falls between the survival minimum of a chain migrant and a single migrant, C (w (C . In this case chain migrants always receive an income which exceeds their survival minimum while single migrants not necessarily so. In case (c) for both categories of migrants there is no guarantee to "nd a job with an income su$cient to reach the survival minimum (Fig. 1) .
Viewed intertemporally, this model provides a quasistationary framework in the sense that wage o!ers evolve in such a way that at any time wage distributions are exponential and normalized to the lowest wage. Wage distributions di!er only with respect to a parameter w which is proportional to the average wage in the economy.
For all three cases the probabilities for a migration to turn out as a success are given by the following equations:
In analogy to Eqs. (3)}(5), using Eqs. (10a)}(10c) it would be possible to derive a set of three corresponding di!erential equations. Further on, we will con"ne the analysis of the stochastic model to case (c) since this is the case that di!ers most from the benchmark model. While in the latter model migration ceases once wages fall below C , the stochastic nature of the matching process now implies that migration continues, though at an ever decreasing magnitude. We believe this characteristic of the stochastic model to be a favorable approximation to reality. In addition, after a su$ciently long period of immigration case (c) represents the only relevant labor market regime for the F economy irrespective of the initial setting. The ratio of the probabilities to "nd a job is given by
that is, the probability for a single migrant to be successful is lower than that for a chain migrant. The distribution
de"nes how the probability to obtain a job with a certain payment decreases with an increasing wage. To illustrate, if is equal to 1, the probability to get a job with a wage that is double the minimal wage is p(w)"1/e. With this labor market framework at hand, we are now ready to set up the model. By de"nition, when the opportunity to migrate opens up "rst all migrants are single migrants. We de"ne m I &flow of potential chain migrants in period k, m I &flow of potential single migrants in period k, n I &flow of actual migrants who find a job in period k.
The pull mechanism, which determines the number of H individuals attracted by a given migrant per period, is given by
Here N $ is the stock of the foreign population in F which is equal to the sum of net migrant in#ows in the K previous periods,
The push mechanism is summarized by
where is the share of potential migrants among the individuals without a network abroad. In a more general formulation, Eq. (16) should be replaced by the expression
International statistics document that the number of immigrants from a given country of origin in a specixc country of destination is generally small relative to the total population of that country of origin (OECD-SOPEMI, 1995) . This does, of course, not imply that the total number of migrants, cumulated over all countries of destination, from a given country of origin is small relative to the total population of that country. Furthermore, sending countries are usually characterized by higher natural population growth rates than receiving countries. The assumption of zero natural population growth in F and an o!setting growth in H is a straightforward way to capture this stylized fact.
Eq. (17) covers two aspects of the migration process. It links the dynamics of the push factor through time to the analysis and re#ects the decreasing size of the home population due to migration in earlier periods, corrected by the number of individuals who were induced to migrate because of the pull factor. Since Eq. (17) asymptotically converges to Eq. (16) if (t) is constant and migration #ows are small compared to the native population (N $ N & ), for simplicity we will employ formula (16) subsequently.
According to Eqs. (10c) and (14), the in#ow of chain migrants who do not have to return because their earnings exceed the survival minimum, equals p ) m I . Analogously, p m I represents the in#ow of single migrants who stay in the destination country. This yields the net in#ow of actual migrants in period k as
Then for case (c) the following equation speci"es the dynamics of the migrant in#ow:
The "rst term describes the net in#ow of single migrants, while the second term represents chain migration. In a linear approximation of the labor demand function, the wage decreases according to
With n I de"ning the in#ow of migrants and N $I representing the stock of the foreign population in F, the per period change in the stock of migrants is given by
The share of single migrants in the current period in#ow, l I , thus equals
Eqs. (19)}(22) state the dynamics of migration in discrete time. The transformation of the discrete time model into a continuous time model is achieved by
By the very nature of the underlying assumptions, in particular that outmigration is small relative to the size of the country of origin, the present model primarily applies to the transitional dynamics of chain migration. Study of the long-run dynamics of chain migration would mandate to endogenize variables (such as the push factor) that we assumed constant and would require consideration of higher-order e!ects (such as the interaction between the two migration-prompting mechanisms). a standard limiting procedure. In continuous time the dynamic process of migration is described by the following di!erential equation,
Eq. (23) expresses the dynamics of the foreign population in the destination country as a function of time and di!erent parameters. In order to solve di!erential equation (23), we draw upon the transformation
with y as a new variable. The variables t and y can now be separated, and the solution can be found as an inverse function analytically. The solution has the form of an inde"nite integral,
Eq. (25) speci"es the relationship between time and the stock of immigrants. From Eq. (23) it follows that dN
. Using Eq. (24), we conclude that yP#R, and the denominator of Eq. (25) approaches zero from above. Thus the integrand is unboundedly increasing but "nite for all "nite y and the integral takes all values strictly between 0 and #R as /w (y(#R. We conclude that yP#R as tP#R. Hence from Eq. (24) we have N $ (t)Pw / as tP#R, that is, the stock of migrants asymptotically converges to w / from below.
Numerical experiments
Although the solution obtained from Eq. (25) is exact, it is necessary to resort to numerical calculations to render a graphical presentation of the results possible. In the subsequent chapter we therefore conduct various numerical experiments to depict the e!ects of di!erent sets of parameters on the in#ow of migrants, the equilibrium wage, and the share of single migrants in the in#ow. Fig. 2 . Dynamics of migration for di!erent . Upper curve corresponds to "1, middle to "1.5, lower to "2.
The rather large number of free parameters (C , C , , , N & , , ) requires to determine some of them in advance in order to isolate the e!ects of parameter changes on the endogenous variables. If we normalize N & to 1, then N $ denotes the stock of migrants as a percentage of the total home population. C is also set to 1 supposing that a chain migrant can initially (t"0) "nd a job with w'C with probability 1, whereas later on he or she will face an increasing return probability. With a growing number of immigrants, however, wages will be negatively a!ected, and thus chain migrants might, along with single migrants, face the necessity to return.
The following numerical calculations provide insights about the dynamics of migration and the relative di$culty for an individual to "nd a job and thus to migrate successfully under di!erent parameter constellations. The main results are depicted in Figs. 2}6. For Figs. 2}4 the following set of parameters was selected: C "1, C "1.5, "1, N & "1, "0.05, "0.5, 3+1, 1.5, 2,. Fig. 2 reveals a dominant in#uence of the wage elasticity of labor demand, 1/ , on the dynamics of migration. If labor demand is inelastic, that is, for a high value of , it is more di$cult for a migrant to "nd a job with a su$cient income to secure the baseline consumption level. Hence, fewer migrants stay. Moreover, a higher number of returning potential migrants implies a smaller number of nuclei for immigration chains. Along with the lower pull capacity of chain migrants total migration is signi"cantly diminished. In this model a relatively inelastic labor demand thus acts as an e!ective regulator of immigration. See Funkhouser and Trejo (1995) for an analysis of labor market skills of newly arriving male immigrants to the USA. Fig. 3 . Wage dynamics for di!erent . Upper curve for "2, lower curve for "1. Fig. 3 shows the wage dynamics for the same parameter values as before. Since the in#ow of immigrant labor is positively related to the elasticity of labor demand for the reasons provided above, the pace of the wage level decline is slower if labor demand is inelastic.
The dynamics of the share of single migrants in total immigration is revealed by Fig. 4 . For high ( "2) the share of single migrants remains relatively high while for low ( "1) it reaches almost zero already after a few periods. In this case immigrants without chains are largely excluded from entering the foreign labor market. Because of this process the host country may su!er from foregone welfare gains if a considerable number of single immigrants have higher skills than the native-born population. Fig. 5 shows the in#uence of simultaneous changes of the parameters and on the in#ow of migrants. Recall that determines the wage structure across vacancies, with a high implying that a large share of the vacancies is low-paid. It turns out that parameter has a considerably stronger in#uence on migration than parameter , that is the elasticity of labor demand is of primary importance for the migration dynamics.
In Fig. 6 we compare the case of pure single migration with the case of single migration combined with chain migration. The parameters used are Fig. 4 . Dynamics of the share of single migrants in total immigration for di!erent : upper curve for "2, lower curve for "1. C "1, C "1.5, "0.1 and "1. For the upper curve "0.2, for the lower curve "0. This implies that the pull mechanism is not e!ective in the second case, that is all migration is single migration. It appears that even for pure single migration the dynamics is non-linear because of the diminishing equilibrium wage. The di!erence between both paths becomes more and more pronounced over time.
Conclusions
The model devised in this paper investigates the dynamics of migration #ows in the presence of chains. Within the framework of this type of model, the dynamics of migration in the presence of chains depends on the wage elasticity of the demand for labor, the intensities of the pull capacity and the push mechanism, the wage structure across vacancies, and the di!erences in the baseline consumption levels between single and chain migrants. The non-linear interaction of these factors gives rise to the phenomenon of hysteresis, wherein factors with early or temporary occurrence persistently a!ect the future dynamics of migration. Since immigrants from a country with an established presence in the host country are more likely to be successful, initial conditions matter, so that initial immigration patterns reinforce future immigration patterns. This implies that the growth of the immigrant population from that country will exceed that of source countries with a smaller established presence. When designing an immigration policy, potential host countries may therefore want to pay special attention to migrants from countries with high pull capacities such as high fertility rates and strong inter-family links.
We fully specify a stochastic two-country model with one sending and one receiving country and derive a non-linear di!erential equation as its solution.
The results of our model are outstandingly sensitive to changes in the wage elasticity of labor demand. The relative importance of the wage elasticity is stronger in our model than in a model with a homogenous group of migrants. The reason is that the wage elasticity of labor demand governs the number of "rst period single migrants who are absorbed by the host country, thereby determining the strength of the multiplier e!ect if we take into account that the second and higher-order periods in#ows are nearly proportional to the number of migrants in the "rst period. In particular if migrants are entitled to but minor social security bene"ts of the receiving economy, the labor market itself may be regarded as an e!ective regulator of migration, and a fortiori so in the case of illegal immigration.
The existence of chains towards a certain destination country reinforces the attraction of this country compared to other potential destination countries. The resulting comparative advantage might overcompensate other, disadvantageous factors in that speci"c destination country. This e!ect might well explain large-scale migration #ows between countries with comparatively small wage di!erentials, and its role becomes ever more pronounced with an increasing di!erence between the living costs of single migrants and chain migrants.
The analysis presented in this paper has a direct bearing for several contentious policy questions. Since the baseline consumption expenses of chain migrants are lower than those of single migrants, this approach has a distinct implication for the skill composition of the migrants who stay in the country of destination. According to Stark (1991) low-skill workers return while high-skill workers stay in consequence of productivity-adjusted wages after the reinstatement of informational symmetry through monitoring. Contrary to the prediction of this approach, despite of individual identi"cation and removal from the pooling process, low-skill workers might be able to draw on their &chain-migration capital' as a substitute for wage averaging and thus stay. To avoid such an outcome of a progressively deteriorating performance of succeeding cohorts of migrants, the country of destination, if it cares about the skill level of the migrants who are there to stay, might wish to spend resources in order to preselect migrants according to their skills (Markusen, 1988; Straubhaar and Zimmermann, 1993) . As appropriate, the receiving economy might also consider to compensate high-skill migrants for the lack of &chain-migration capital'. Furthermore, the model suggests that #ows of single and chain migrants also di!er in their gender composition. Given that wages for female labor are lower than for male labor even if di!erences in education are controlled for and the minimum subsistence levels are approximately equal for both sexes, the likelihood for a female immigrant to "nd a job with a wage that is su$cient to cover her baseline consumption expenses is lower than that for a male immigrant with the same quali"cation. It follows that the typical single migrant would be male while women would predominantly engage in chain migration to enhance their chances to bene"t from the potentially rewarding opportunity to migrate. In this way women might counteract the e!ect of gender discrimination on economic performance. Contrary to before, where the existence of chains turned out to trigger a potentially disadvantageous skill composition for the receiving economy, a high ratio of chain migrants relative to single migrants facilitates access to female labor resources and should in this case augment the bene"ts from migration that accrue to the country of destination. Finally, our model predicts that the composition of the migrant in#ow di!ers conditional on the phase of the business cycle. During recessions a smaller share of high-paid vacancies should be available for migrants since the competition for these vacancies among natives increases, which implies that migrants face a steepening wage distribution across vacancies. The testable hypothesis here is that during periods of an economic downturn the share of chain migrants in total immigration is higher than during phases of prosperity. This e!ect should occur independently of an intervention of immigration authorities since it stems directly from the optimizing behavior of labor market participants.
